Practice Parameters as a Shield Against Physician Liability by Kuc, Gary W.
Journal of Contemporary Health Law & Policy (1985-2015) 
Volume 10 Issue 1 Article 28 
1994 
Practice Parameters as a Shield Against Physician Liability 
Gary W. Kuc 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/jchlp 
Recommended Citation 
Gary W. Kuc, Practice Parameters as a Shield Against Physician Liability, 10 J. Contemp. Health L. & Pol'y 
439 (1994). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.edu/jchlp/vol10/iss1/28 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by CUA Law Scholarship Repository. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Journal of Contemporary Health Law & Policy (1985-2015) by an authorized editor of CUA 
Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact edinger@law.edu. 
PRACTICE PARAMETERS AS A SHIELD
AGAINST PHYSICIAN LIABILITY
Currently, the legal process faces far more difficulty in uncover-
ing what the standard of care is in a particular domain of
medicine than it does in adjudicating matters of fact regarding
what actually took place in a particular case [of alleged medical
malpractice].
How much simpler it would be if there existed a set of stan-
dards about which there could be little debate.1
The State of Maine is conducting a five-year medical liability demon-
stration project (Project)2 that establishes practice parameters and risk
management protocols (practice parameters or parameters)3 in four med-
1. Mark R. Chassin, Standards of Care in Medicine, 25 INQUIRY 437, 448 (1988).
2. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 2971-78 (West Supp. 1991). The Project began
January 1, 1992 and ends December 31, 1996. Id. § 2975(4).
3. A practice parameter defines appropriate clinical indications and methods of treat-
ment for a specific medical condition. Id. § 2973. A risk management protocol defines
standards of medical practice designed to avoid malpractice claims and to increase the
defensibility of the malpractice actions that plaintiffs pursue. Id. The Project establishes
practice parameters and protocols within the medical specialties of anesthesiology, emer-
gency medicine, obstetrics and gynecology, and radiology. Id. § 2972(1). In each field, a
medical specialty advisory committee (Advisory Committee) develops its respective prac-
tice parameters. Id. The Advisory Committees on emergency medicine and radiology re-
gard practice parameters as:
strategies of patient management, developed to assist physicians in clinical deci-
sion-making. Practice parameters include standards, guidelines, and other patient
management strategies. Standards are accepted principles for patient manage-
ment. Guidelines are recommendations for patient management which identify a
particular management strategy or a range of management strategies. Other
strategies for patient management include practice policies and practice options.
Code Me. R. §§ 02-373-022 app. 1 at 1, -026 app. 1 at 1 (1991). According to the Advisory
Committee on anesthesiology, practice parameters are "standards, guidelines and other
patient management strategies that result in high quality of patient care but which also
recognize that there is a finite limit of resources available for health care." Id. § 02-373-
020. The Advisory Committee on obstetrics and gynecology does not define the term.
The variety of definitions and terms used by the Advisory Committees reflects the lack
of consensus within the medical profession on the appropriate terminology. One com-
monly used term is "practice guidelines," which are defined as "[s]tandardized specifica-
tions for care developed by a formal process that incorporates the best scientific evidence
of effectiveness with expert opinion." Lucian L. Leape, Practice Guidelines and Standards:
An Overview, 16 QUALITY REV. BULL. 42, 43 (1990); see also Chassin, supra note 1, at 438
(defining practice guidelines as "statements describing specific diagnostic or therapeutic
maneuvers that should or should not be performed in certain specific clinical circum-
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ical specialties4 and gives the parameters the force and effect of law.5 In
a medical malpractice action against a physician who participates in the
Project,6 the physician may introduce the practice parameters into evi-
dence as an affirmative defense.7 To prevail on the basis of this defense,
stances"). Another term is "practice policies," which are defined as "preformed recom-
mendations issued for the purpose of influencing decisions about health interventions."
David M. Eddy, Practice Policies-What Are They?, 263 JAMA 877, 877 (1990) [hereinaf-
ter Practice Policies]. Practice policies encompass guidelines (which are flexible), standards
(which are inflexible), and options (which are descriptive but not prescriptive). David M.
Eddy, Designing a Practice Policy: Standards, Guidelines and Options, 263 JAMA 3077,
3077 (1990). Additionally, the concept of practice parameters has been referred to in
terms of performance measures, review criteria, boundary guidelines, pathway guidelines,
and algorithms. Leape, supra at 43-44.
4. The practice parameters for anesthesiology include: (1) the Anesthesia Record;
(2) Anesthesia Standards for Basic Intraoperative Monitoring; (3) Standards for Postanes-
thesia Care; and (4) Preoperative Laboratory Testing. Code Me. R. § 02-373-020 app. 1 at
1 (1991).
The practice parameters for emergency medicine cover: (1) Cervical Spine X-Rays for
Acute Trauma Patients; and (2) Transfer of Patient to Other Hospitals. Id. § 02-373-022
app. 1 at 1-4.
The practice parameters for obstetrics and gynecology encompass: (1) Cesarean Deliv-
ery for Failure to Progress; (2) Assessment of Fetal Maturity Prior to Repeat Cesarean
Delivery or Elective Induction of Labor; (3) Hysterectomy, Abdominal or Vaginal (Indica-
tion: Leiomyomata); (4) Hysterectomy, Abdominal or Vaginal (Indication: Abnormal
uterine bleeding in women of reproductive age); (5) Tocolysis; (6) Presumed Ectopic Preg-
nancy in Clinically Stable Patient; (7) Singleton Breech Presentation; (8) Perinatal Herpes
Simplex Virus Infections; (9) Intrapartum Fetal Distress; and (10) Antepartum Manage-
ment of Prolonged Pregnancy. Id. § 02-373-024 app. 1 at 1.
The practice parameters for radiology cover: (1) Performance of Screening Mam-
mography; (2) Antepartum Ultrasound; (3) Outpatient Angiography; and (4) Performance
of Adult Barium Enema Examinations. Id. § 02-373-026 app. 1 at 1.
5. The Project directs the Board of Registration in Medicine (Board) to review the
practice parameters that the Advisory Committees develop, to approve those appropriate
for each medical specialty area, and to adopt them as rules under the Maine Administra-
tive Procedure Act. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2973 (West Supp. 1991) (citation omit-
ted). A rule is "the whole or any part of every regulation, standard, code, statement of
policy, or other agency statement of general applicability ... that is or is intended to be
judicially enforceable and implements, interprets or makes specific the law administered by
the agency." Id. tit. 5, § 8002(9)(A).
6. The Project does not apply to a medical specialty unless at least 50% of the physi-
cians licensed in Maine who practice in that field elect to participate in the Project. Id. tit.
24, § 2976. This requirement has been met in the four medical specialties covered by the
Project. Telephone interview with Gordon H. Smith, Counsel, Maine Medical Association
(Sept. 8, 1992).
7. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2975(1) (West Supp. 1991). The physician must set
forth the affirmative defense of compliance with the practice parameters when answering
the plaintiff's complaint. ME. R. Civ. P. 8(c). Moreover, the physician is barred from
relying upon the affirmative defense when moving for judgment on the pleadings or for
dismissal for failure to state a claim. MacKerron v. MacKerron, 571 A.2d 810, 813 (Me.
1994] Practice Parameters and Physician Liability 441
the physician must prove compliance with the parameters.8 Although the
physician may proffer the parameters as evidence,9 once the court admits
them, the plaintiff may present evidence on the issue of compliance' ° and
may attempt to use the parameters against the physician.'1 As legal
predeterminations of appropriate medical care, the Project's practice pa-
rameters affect the core of medical malpractice litigation: the standard of
care.
The influence of the parameters should be salutary because the stan-
dard of care that the law of negligence' 2 imposes on physicians is elusive
1990). But "[i]f the complaint itself affirmatively demonstrates the existence and the appli-
cability of the affirmative defense, then the defense may serve as the basis for dismissal."
Cunningham v. Haza, 538 A.2d 265, 267 (Me. 1988) (citations omitted). However, this
exception to the MacKerron rule is of no avail to the physician at the pleadings stage be-
cause the plaintiff cannot raise the issue of the practice parameters unless the physician has
done so first. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2975(1) (West Supp. 1991).
8. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2975(2) (West Supp. 1991).
9. Id. § 2975(1).
10. Id. § 2975(2).
11. Gordon H. Smith, Maine's Liability Demonstration Project-Relating Liability to
Practice Parameters, ST. HEALTH LEGIs. REP., Fall 1990, at 1, 3. Clearly, one aim of the
Project is to protect physicians who comply with the practice parameters from legal liabil-
ity. This is a defensive use of practice parameters. See Mark A. Hall, The Defensive Effect
of Medical Practice Policies in Malpractice Litigation, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring
1991, at 119, 121. Practice parameters also might have an offensive effect if they increase
the liability exposure of a physician who does not comply with them. See Edward B.
Hirshfeld, Practice Parameters and the Malpractice Liability of Physicians, 263 JAMA 1556,
1560 (1990); see also Eleanor D. Kinney & Marilyn M. Wilder, Medical Standard Setting in
the Current Malpractice Environment: Problems and Possibilities, 22 U.C. DAVIs L. REV.
421, 450 (1989) (arguing that if "the medical profession established standards.., and medi-
cal experts relied on those standards in testifying at trial, defendant physicians would have
a greater chance of being held to an appropriate standard of care"); royen A. Brennan,
Practice Guidelines and Malpractice Litigation: Collision or Cohesion?, 16 J. HEALTH POL.
POL'Y & L. 67, 68 (1991) (arguing that "guidelines should act as useful inculpatory or
exculpatory evidence of the standard of care").
12. Negligence is "conduct which falls below the standard established by law for the
protection of others against unreasonable risk of harm." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 282 (1965); see also W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS § 31, at 169, 171 (5th ed. 1984) ("Negligence is a matter of risk-that is to
say, of recognizable danger of injury.... Against this probability, and gravity, of the risk,
must be balanced in every case the utility of the type of conduct in question."). Medical
malpractice is simply one type of negligent conduct. Id. § 32, at 185-86.
Missing from definitions of negligence is the "standard of care by which conduct can be
evaluated and found to be unreasonably dangerous." Page Keeton, Medical Negligence-
The Standard of Care, 10 TEx. TECH L. REV. 351, 351 (1979). It is simply not possible to
fix definite rules in advance for all conceivable human conduct. KEETON ET AL., supra
§ 32, at 173. To remedy this problem, the law created a fictitious person: the "reasonable
man of ordinary prudence." Id. at 174. The defendant is held to the standard of what the
reasonable man of ordinary prudence would do in his or her place. Id. The jury makes this
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at best.13 Currently, the law defines "good medical practice" as that
which is "customary and usual in the profession."'14 In Maine, physicians
are held "to the standard of care of an ordinarily competent physician
under like conditions."' 5 To prove a case of medical malpractice, the
plaintiff must establish the appropriate standard of care, the physician's
deviation from the standard, and that the physician's breach of the stan-
comparison and thus decides the issue of negligence. Keeton, supra at 352. However in
the medical malpractice context, the reasonable person approach presents unique
problems because a jury is generally unqualified to judge independently the reasonable-
ness of a physician's conduct. See infra note 17 and accompanying text.
13. Prior to 1950, the definition of the legal standard of care that courts applied in
medical malpractice actions was often "imprecise, ambiguous and inconsistent." Keeton,
supra note 12, at 358. During the past four decades, the standard of care imposed on
physician conduct has been expressed in such various terms as the medical practice in the
"same or similar community," the "national custom," and "accepted medical practices and
procedures." Id. at 360-65. However, the law still "faces far more difficulty in uncovering
what the standard of care is in a particular domain of medicine than it does in adjudicating
matters of fact regarding what actually took place in a particular case." Chassin, supra
note 1, at 448; see also Joseph H. King, Jr., In Search of a Standard of Care for the Medical
Profession: The "Accepted Practice" Formula, 28 VAND. L. REV. 1213 (1975) (arguing for
clarification and reappraisal of the standard of care in the law of medical malpractice).
14. KEETON ET AL., supra note 12, § 32, at 189. However, in a negligence action
outside the medical malpractice context, a showing that the defendant followed the cus-
tomary or usual practice is merely evidence to be, considered in determining whether he or
she complied with the standard of care but is not itself determinative of the standard of
care. Id. § 33, at 195.
15. McLaughlin v. Sy, 589 A.2d 448,452 (Me. 1991). However, if a physician is nation-
ally certified and holds himself out as a specialist in a particular field of medical expertise,
then he will be held to the standard of care of all physicians in that specialty. Johnson .v.
Gerrish, 518 A.2d 721, 722-23 (Me. 1986); Taylor v. Hill, 464 A.2d 938, 943 (Me. 1983);
Roberts v. Tardif, 417 A.2d 444, 452 (Me. 1980). Maine law does not. provide that the
defendant's conduct is measured solely by the standard of care of the medical profession in
his or her locale. McLaughlin, 589 A.2d at 452; Taylor, 464 A.2d at 942 n.1; Roberts, 417
A.2d at 451; Josselyn v. Dearborn, 62 A.2d 174, 181 (Me. 1948).
However, the Josselyn court noted that the phrase "like conditions" was broad enough
to cover the degree of skill and care required of a physician practicing in the defendant's
locale. Id. Thus, the jury could consider "the location of the defendant .... that he did not
have ... certain medicines and equipment that were available in larger centers of popula-
tion .... [and that he] is approximately 130 miles from . . . [available] hospital and labora-
tory facilities." Id. Forty-three years later, the McLaughlin court limited the holding in
Josselyn by concluding that "[ijocality is, at most, a factor in the overall circumstances."
McLaughlin, 589 A.2d at 452. The McLaughlin court also noted that in cases where local-
ity had been mentioned as an element of the standard of care, the community factor had
not been at issue. Id. (citing Caron v. Pratt, 336 A.2d 856, 859 (Me. 1975); Downer v.
Veilleux, 322 A.2d 82, 91 (Me. 1974); Duguay v. Pomerleau, 299 A.2d 914, 917 (Me. 1973);
Aronson v. Perkins, 233 A.2d 726, 728 (Me. 1967); Cyr v. Giesen, 108 A.2d 316, 318 (Me.
1954)). Therefore, Maine physicians are held to a standard of care determined "under all
the relevant circumstances." Id.
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dard proximately caused the alleged injury.16 Ordinarily, the plaintiff can
carry this burden of proof only through expert medical testimony. 7 If
the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the physician must present
contrary expert testimony.'" The resulting "battle of experts"'19 obfus-
cates the standard of care2" and encourages the use of paid experts whose
16. Ouellette v. Mehalic, 534 A.2d 1331, 1332 (Me. 1988). The Project does not affect,
alter, or change the plaintiff's burden of proof. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2975(2)-(3)
(West Supp. 1991).
17. Patten v. Milam, 480 A.2d 774, 778 (Me. 1984); Cox v. Dela Cruz, 406 A.2d 620,
622 (Me. 1979); Downer v. Veilleux, 322 A.2d 82, 84-85 (Me. 1974); Cyr v. Giesen, 108
A.2d 316, 318 (Me. 1954). Expert medical testimony is required because the law presumes
that juries are incompetent to independently judge questions of medical science or technol-
ogy. KEETON ET AL., supra note 12, § 32, at 188; Hall, supra note 11, at 126; Kinney &
Wilder, supra note 11, at 440. In a negligence action outside the medical malpractice con-
text, expert testimony is also often used to afford guidance to the trier of fact "but rarely
will be as conclusive with respect to the standard of care as it often is in medical malprac-
tice cases." King, supra.note 13, at 1236. An exception to the general rule that requires
expert testimony in medical malpractice actions is recognized where the physician's con-
duct is so egregious as to lie within the common knowledge of laymen. Patten, 480 A.2d at
778; Cox, 406 A.2d at 622; Downer, 322 A.2d at 84; Cyr, 108 A.2d at 318. See, e.g., Lanier
v. rammell, 180 S.W.2d 818, 820-21 (Ark. 1944) (failure to wash hands and to sterilize
instruments before eye operation); Laws v. Harter, 534 S.W.2d 449, 450-51 (Ky. 1975) (sur-
gical sponge left in patient).
18. Kinney & Wilder, supra note 11, at 440.
19. "[Tlhe opinions of the experts on each side are often-in disagreement. When this
happens .... [the] process of comparing the defendant's conduct with established profes-
sional norms degenerates into a swearing contest." Hall, supra note 11, at 127. The expert
witnesses vie to convince the jury of the appropriateness and necessity of the medical prac-
tice they endorse. Eleanor Kinney, New Standards for the Standard of Care, LEGAL TIMES,
Nov. 18, 1991, at 22,24 (Supplement entitled Health Law's Cutting Edge). Because the law
leaves the definition of the standard of care and the determination of a breach of the
standard to the medical profession, "[tihe judge and jury have no role in evaluating the
defendant physician's conduct directly but rather only evaluate the persuasiveness of the
expert testimony in light of all other evidence." Kinney & Wilder, supra note 11, at 440
(emphasis added).
20. Lost in the exchange of conflicting expert testimony is a comparison of the physi-
cian's conduct with the medical profession's usual and customary standard of care. Hall,
supra note 11, at 127. Instead,
physicians [testifying as experts] rely on how they would have conducted them-
selves ... in the particular situation at issue. This is particularly true if there are
no standards, recommendations or guidelines .... As a result, a defendant physi-
cian often is held to-a standard of care that reflects the "habit" of the medical
expert testifying.
Kinney & Wilder, supra note 11, at 442. Thus, the "battle of experts" puts in issue the
credentials of the expert witnesses rather than whether the defendant complied with the
medical profession's standard of care. Hall, supra note 11, at 127. Moreover, it cannot be
assumed that an attorney will necessarily employ the most qualified expert. Instead, coun-
sel "will probably choose the expert who will best support his client's cause, and, perhaps,
conceal its weaknesses." Judge Theodore I. Botter, The Court-Appointed Impartial Expert,
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objectivity may be suspect.2 Maine's practice parameters promise to ra-
tionalize the legal process of determining the appropriate standard of
care.
22
Since the late 1980s, practice parameters have rapidly emerged as the
medical profession's response 23 to the charge that the medical standard of
care "appear[s] to be arbitrary-highly variable, with no obvious explana-
tion."'24 Supporting this claim are studies by epidemiologists who have
documented wide geographic variations in the rate of utilization of health
care services25 and specific medical procedures. 26 For example, in Maine
in USING EXPERTS IN CIVIL CASES 53, 53 (Melvin D. Kraft ed., 2d ed. 1982) (citation
omitted).
21. See, e.g., Edwin Chen, Testimony for Sale: Paid Experts Score Big in Legal Game,
L.A. TIMES, Jan. 6, 1983, at 1 ("[A]s the use of expert witnesses has grown, so has the
concern that some are abusing their roles by ranging far afield from their areas of exper-
tise, or by being less than truthful about their credentials and experiences."); Edwin Chen,
Trial Questions Reliability of Expert Legal Testimony, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 6, 1983, at 3 ("Law-
yers experienced in personal injury litigation generally have characterized physicians work-
ing for the opposition as hired guns-a criticism not without some validity, considering the
conflicting testimony such witnesses frequently give."); Expert Witnesses: Booming Busi-
ness for the Specialists, N.Y.TIMES, July 5, 1987, at 1 ("The business of being an expert is
... exploding .... [Experts] can be hired to bring their learning to lawsuits ... by nearly
anyone able to pay their rates, which can ...[exceed] $10,000 a day for a plastic
surgeon.").
22. See Brennan, supra note 11, at 73 ("[S]tandard-of-care guidelines will help ration-
alize malpractice litigation."); Hall, supra note 11, at 126 (Practice policies may effect
"legal reform by creating more rigorously defined standards of care that improve the func-
tioning of the malpractice system."); Clark C. Havighurst, Practice Guidelines As Legal
Standards Governing Physician Liability, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1991, at 87, 88
("[Gluidelines will assist in setting legal standards of care that are both clearer and more
rational than those that courts are currently using to identify professional negligence.");
Richard E. Leahy, Rational Health Policy and the Legal Standard of Care: A Call for Judi-
cial Deference to Medical Practice Guidelines, 77 CAL. L. REV. 1483, 1486 (1989) (Practice
guidelines "will facilitate a more accurate fit between the legal standard and actual medical
standards than the current method of charging juries with the task of assessing expert
testimony.").
23. See infra notes 41-52 and accompanying text.
24. David M. Eddy, The Challenge, 263 JAMA 287, 287 (1990). The standard of care
is best explained by the common assumption that "whatever a physician decides is, by
definition, correct." Id. This questionable presumption raises the very disturbing implica-
tion that, at least for some patients, medical care is suboptimal or even harmful. Id.
25. See, e.g., Mark R. Chassin et al., Variations in the Use of Medical and Surgical
Services by the Medicare Population, 314 NEW ENG. J. MED. 285 (1986); Charles E. Lewis,
Variations in the Incidence of Surgery, 281 NEW ENG. J. MED. 880 (1969); John Wennberg
& Alan Gittelsohn, Variations in Medical Care Among Small Areas, Sci. AM., April 1982,
at 120; John Wennberg & Alan Gittelsohn, Small Area Variations in Health Care Delivery,
182 Sci. 1102 (1973); see also Pamela Paul-Shaheen et al., Small Area Analysis: A Review
and Analysis of the North American Literature, 12 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 741 (1987)
(reviewing studies of geographic variations in delivery of health care services).
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the chance of a woman having a hysterectomy by the age of seventy var-
ies across the state from less than 20% to more than 70%.27 A major
cause of medical practice variation is physician uncertainty regarding the
appropriate clinical indications for many forms of treatment.28 If the ap-
propriate clinical indications for medical procedures are defined and
widely disseminated through practice parameters for physician use, the
opportunities for misuse of treatments would diminish.29 Thus, Maine's
practice parameters could potentially improve the quality of medical care
in the state and thereby reduce the incidence of iatrogenic injury.30
26. Mark R. Chassin et al., How Coronary Angiography Is Used, 258 JAMA 2543
(1987); Allan M. Greenspan et al., Incidence of Unwarranted Implantation of Permanent
Cardiac Pacemakers in a Large Medical Population, 318 NEW ENG. J. MED. 158 (1988);
Katherine L. Kahn et al., The Use and Misuse of Upper Gastrointestinal Endoscopy, 109
ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 664 (1988); Constance M. Winslow et al., The Appropriateness of
Carotid Endarterectomy, 318 NEW ENG. J. MED. 721 (1988); Constance M. Winslow et al.,
The Appropriateness of Performing Coronary Artery Bypass Surgery, 260 JAMA 505
(1988).
27. John E. Wennberg, Dealing with Medical Practice Variation: A Proposal for Ac-
tion, HEALTH AFF., Summer 1984, at 6, 9. Although "[s]ome variation in practice patterns
can be expected due to differences in the incidence of various diseases, patients' prefer-
ences, and the available resources .... these variations should be small and explainable."
David M. Eddy, Variations in Physician Practice: The Role of Uncertainty, HEALTH AFF.,
Summer 1984, at 74, 75.
28. Eddy, supra note 27, at 75, ("Uncertainty creeps into medical practice through
every pore."); ALAIN C. ENTHOVEN, HEALTH PLAN xix (1980) ("Uncertainty pervades
medical diagnosis and treatment."); Ann L. Greer, The State of the Art Versus the State of
the Science, 4 INT'L J. TECH. ASSESSMENT HEALTH CARE 5, 8 (1988) ("[One problem,
viewed broadly, underlies many analyses of the culture of medicine: this is the problem of
uncertainty.") (citation omitted) [hereinafter State of the Art]; JAY KATZ, THE SILENT
WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT 166 (1984) ("Medical knowledge is engulfed and infil-
trated by uncertainty."). Amid physician uncertainty is the irony that science and technol-
ogy have provided a vast foundation of knowledge that physicians can draw upon to make
quality health care decisions for their patients. J. Jarrett Clinton, Improving Clinical Prac-
tice, 267 JAMA 2652, 2652 (1992). Unfortunately, for the practicing physician with limited
time, the amount of available information is overwhelming, typically fragmented, difficult
to evaluate, and sometimes contradictory. Leape, supra note 3, at 43. Thus, widespread
implementation of research-based methods to improve medical care is stymied. Clinton,
supra at 2652. Medicine's challenge is to evaluate and assimilate its scientific knowledge,
consider current medical practice and the results it achieves, and adopt practice parameters
that will work best in practice. Id.
Other explanations for variation in medical practice include monetary incentives, patient
expectations, peer opinion, physician and patient personalities, physician habits and deci-
sion-making, clinical training experience, and practice organization. See JOHN M. EISEN-
BERG, DOCTORS' DECISIONS AND THE COST OF MEDICAL CARE 12 (1986); Ann L. Greer,
The Two Cultures of Biomedicine: Can There Be Consensus?, 258 JAMA 2739, 2739
(1987); State of the Art, supra at 6.
29. Leape, supra note 3, at 43.
30. See Chassin, supra note 1, at 449 (arguing that practice standards can be used to
446 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 10:439
This Comment examines the union between the legal and medical stan-
dards of care in the practice parameters of the Maine Project. Part I re-
views the parameters phenomenon and examines the Project's legislative
history and policy objectives. Part II examines the development of the
parameters by the Project's medical specialty advisory committees and
the adoption of the practice parameters as administrative rules by the
Maine Board of Registration in Medicine. Part III analyzes how the
Maine Rules of Evidence will govern the use of the practice parameters
in medical malpractice litigation. Finally, based on the Project's policy
objectives and the manner in which the practice parameters were estab-
lished, this Comment concludes that Maine courts should instruct juries
that the practice parameters define the legal standard of care.
I. BACKGROUND OF THE MAINE PROJECT
A. The Practice Parameters Phenomenon
Understood as summaries of information regarding standard and ac-
cepted medical practices, practice parameters have existed in one form or
another for centuries.3 In the past, they have found expression in medi-
cal textbooks, medical journal articles, and "conversations in hospital caf-
eterias."'32 Indeed, in medical malpractice litigation, evidence of the
standard of care comes from such medical textbooks and journal arti-
cles.33 In the late 1980s, however, practice parameters shifted away from
being passive aids for physician decision-making to active medical man-
agement tools. 34 Parameters are now framed specifically to assure qual-
ity and to contain cost.35 The development of practice parameters also
has rapidly changed from a decentralized informal process to systematic
formal programs.36 This transformation was spurred both by medical
improve medical practice); Leahy, supra note 22, at 1491 (arguing that practice guidelines
can facilitate improvement in the quality of medical care, decrease the use of inappropriate
and unnecessary procedures, and lead to fewer incidences of iatrogenic harm); Kinney,
supra note 19, at 25 (arguing that practice guidelines will have a positive influence on the
overall quality of health care in the United States).
31. David M. Eddy, Practice Policies: Where Do They Come From?, 263 JAMA 1265,
1265 (1990).
32. Id.
33. Hirshfeld, supra note 11, at 1556.
34. Practice Policies, supra note 3, at 880. Practice parameters address three general
types of problems associated with the utilization of health care services: overuse, un-
deruse, and improper use. Chassin, supra note 1, at 439.
35. Practice Policies, supra note 3, at 880.
36. Id.
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studies that criticized the wide variation in health care utilization rates 7
and the scientific validity of many clinical practices,38 and by policymak-
ers who want to use practice parameters to allocate health care resources
more efficiently.39 The practice parameters phenomenon promises to
continue in the 1990s.4
The wide variety of interests involved in the practice parameters move-
ment contribute to its momentum. The American Medical Association
(AMA), which once disdained formal standards as "cookbook
medicine,"41 is now actively involved in developing parameters. 42 In
1989, the federal government established the Agency for Health Care
Policy and Research (AHCPR) in the Department of Health and Human
Services.43 AHCPR is developing practice parameters to help physicians
37. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
38. See, e.g., David M. Eddy & John Billings, The Quality of Medical Evidence: Impli-
cations for Quality of Care, HEALTH AFF., Spring 1988, at 19, 20 ("[FIor at least some
important practices, the existing evidence is of such poor quality that it is virtually impossi-
ble to determine even what effect the practice has on patients, much less whether that
effect is preferable to the outcomes that would have occurred with other options."); David
M. Eddy, Clinical Policies and the Quality of Clinical Practice, 307 NEW ENO. J. MED. 343,
343 (1982) ("[T]here is reason to believe that there are flaws in the process by which the
profession generates clinical policies.").
39. Leahy, supra note 22, at 1484-85.
40. Anne-Marie Audet et al., Medical Practice Guidelines: Current Activities and Fu-
ture Directions, 113 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 709,709 (1990). During the second presiden-
tial debate in the fall of 1992, Bill Clinton stated that his health care reform package would
call for the development and use of national practice parameters. The '92 Vote (ABC
television broadcast, Oct. 15, 1992) (transcript on file with The Journal of Contemporary
Health Law and Policy).
41. "Cookbook" medicine refers to "restrict[ing] physicians to one procedure or series
of procedures for a specific condition." Interview with James S. Todd, AMA Exec. V.P.,
AM. MED. NEWS, Jan. 6, 1989, at 47 (internal quotations omitted). This approach is objec-
tionable to the AMA because it insists that "[n]o two patients are exactly alike and no two
conditions are exactly alike." Id. (internal quotations omitted). Thus, the AMA's ap-
proach is to keep practice parameters flexible and open-ended. Id.
42. See, e.g., OFFICE OF QUALITY ASSURANCE, AMERICAN MEDICAL ASS'N, ArrRia-
UTES TO GUIDE THE DEVELOPMENT OF PRACTICE PARAMETERS (1990); OFFICE OF QUAL-
Try ASSURANCE, AMERICAN MEDICAL ASS'N, DIRECTORY OF PRACTICE PARAMETERS,
GUIDELINES, AND TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENTS (1990): The AMA's change in attitude was
occasioned by the realization that, although the use of practice parameters as a manage-
ment tool might have a desirable impact on the quality of care and health care costs, such
use may have undesirable effects for practicing physicians. Practice Policies, supra note 3,
at 880. "[Tlhe greatest concern pertains to control. It is not stretching things too far to say
that whoever controls practice policies controls medicine." Id.
43. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989 § 901, 42 U.S.C.A. § 299 (West 1991
& Supp. 1993). The federal government has also sponsored other practice parameters ac-
tivities. See, e.g., PHYSICIAN PAYMENT REVIEW COMM'N, 1990 ANNUAL REPORT TO CON-
GRESS 235 (endorsing development of practice parameters).
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determine how health conditions can most effectively be prevented, diag-
nosed, treated, and managed clinically." AHCPR is also producing stan-
dards of quality and medical review criteria for appropriate entities to use
to assess the provision of health care and to assure its quality.45 Practice
parameters have also been implemented or sponsored by state govern-
ments,46 private health care researchers, 47 third-party payers,48 health
benefit plan sponsors,49 medical specialty societies,1° and voluntary
health organizations.5' These groups view practice parameters as a
means of improving the quality and the affordability of medical care.52
B. History and Objectives of the Project
The State of Maine focused on two issues of health care policy: (1) the
increase in the cost of health insurance, and (2) the practice of "defensive
medicine., 53 In the late 1980s both issues were identified in a series of
meetings of the Healthcare Roundtable, a Maine group that regularly
44. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989 § 912, 42 U.S.C.A. § 299b-1 (West
1991 & Supp. 1993).
45. Id.
46. The Commonwealth of Massachusetts utilizes practice parameters in the risk man-
agement unit of the government agency responsible for licensing and disciplining physi-
cians. Kinney, supra note 19, at 25. See also Brian McCormick, Defense Lawyers Raise
Questions about Maine Parameters Project, AM. MED. NEWS, May 6, 1991, at 1, 41 (noting
that the administrative rulemaking process in New Jersey has also linked practice parame-
ters with liability).
47. Kinney & Wilder, supra note 11, at 426 (citing eight published studies on the de-
velopment of practice parameters by Robert Brook, M.D., under the auspices of the Rand
Corporation).
48. "The Blue Cross/Blue Shield Association commissioned the American College of
Physicians [ACP] . . .to produce guidelines for the appropriateness of the fifteen most
common diagnostic tests." Hall, supra note 11, at 124.
49. See Lawrence K. Gottlieb et al., Clinical Practice Guidelines at an HMO: Develop-
ment and Implementation in a Quality Improvement Model, 16 QUALITY REV. BULL. 80
(1990).
50. See, e.g., AM. Soc'Y OF ANESTHESIOLOGISTS, ASA STANDARDS, GUIDELINES AND
STATEMENTS (1992); COMM. ON PRE AND POSTOPERATIVE CARE, AM. COLLEGE OF SUR-
GEONS, MANUAL OF PREOPERATIVE AND POSTOPERATIVE CARE (3d ed. 1983); CLINICAL
EFFICACY ASSESSMENT PROJECT, AM. COLLEGE OF PHYSICIANS, RECOMMENDATIONS
(1987); AM. ACADEMY OF PEDIATRICS, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON INFECTIOUS DIS-
EASES (Georges Peter, M.D. et al. eds., 22d ed. 1991).
51. See, e.g., CECILIA M. FENOGLIO-PREISER, M.D. & ROBERT V.P. HUTrER, M.D.,
AM. CANCER SOC'Y, COLORECTAL POLYPS: PATHOLOGICAL DIAGNOSIS AND CLINICAL
SIGNIFICANCE (1985); AM. HEART ASS'N, DIET AND CORONARY HEART DISEASE (1978);
AM. DIABETES ASS'N, PHYSICIAN'S GUIDE TO INSULIN-DEPENDENT (TYPE I) DIABETES:
DIAGNOSIS AND TREATMENT (1988).
52. Havighurst, supra note 22, at 87.
53. Smith, supra note 11, at 1.
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meets to initiate legislation and other programs to make health insurance
in Maine more affordable.54 Members of the Healthcare Roundtable in-
clude Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Maine, the Maine Ambulatory Care Co-
alition, the Maine Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the Maine
Hospital Association, the Maine Medical Association (MMA), and the
Maine State Employees Association.55 One group that has consistently
opposed the efforts of the Healthcare Roundtable regarding the Project
is the Maine Trial Lawyers Association. 6
Part of the upward pressure on the price of health insurance is the gen-
erally high cost of medical care in the United States.57 Because some
care is medically unnecessary, 8 expenditures on health care and health
insurance reflect an inefficient allocation of consumer resources.59 By
defining appropriate clinical indications for tests, operations, and medical
procedures, practice parameters offer the opportunity to rationalize the
delivery of health care and thereby reduce its overall cost.6" Although
they may promote efficient utilization of health care resources, practice
parameters generally are not driven directly by cost considerations.61
The AMA and MMA subscribe to this noneconomic approach to devel-
oping practice parameters. 62
The Healthcare Roundtable was also concerned that health care costs
were artificially high because physicians in Maine were employing a wide
range of tests and procedures simply to avoid or defend against a possible
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 2; see also Gary M. Stephenson, Maine's Guidelines Experiment Ready to
Begin, REP. MED. GUIDELINES & OUTCOMES RES., Dec. 1, 1991, at 1, 6 (noting that Robert
Stolt, legislative chairman for the Maine Trial Lawyers Association, criticized the Project as
too rigid and inflexible).
57. Americans are spending over a half a trillion dollars each year on health care. U.S.
GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: A CONTINUING PROBLEM WITH
FAR-REACHING IMPLICATIONS 1 (1990) [hereinafter GAO MALPRACTICE REPORT]. More-
over, from 1965 to 1990, spending on health care rose from 6% of the gross domestic
product to about 12%; in the next decade that figure is estimated to reach 15%. Id. Since
1960, health care costs have risen at more than double the rate of general inflation. Id.
58. See supra notes 25-26, 38 and accompanying text.
59. Cf Leahy, supra note 22, at 1485.
60. Leape, supra note 3, at 43.
61. Ronni Scheier, Medicine by the Book, AM. MED. NEWS, Jan. 6, 1989, at 1, 22 (not-
ing that the AMA avoids developing practice parameters based on economic considera-
tions). But see Leahy, supra note 22, at 1517 (arguing that "cost-effectiveness analysis
places priorities on alternative expenditures without assessing a dollar value on life and
health").
62. Smith, supra note 11, at 2.
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lawsuit. 3 Although the impact of defensive medicine on national health
care expenditures is difficult to measure, the estimated cost for 1984
alone was $12.1 to $13.7 billion.' The effects of medical malpractice liti-
gation are not limited to encouraging physicians to practice defensive
medicine. The increasing number of lawsuits filed65 and the rising
amount of damages recovered66 have been matched by increases in medi-
cal malpractice insurance premiums.67 Physicians facing these additional
63. Physicians who conduct themselves in this manner are practicing "defensive
medicine." Laurence R. Tancredi & Jeremiah A. Barondess, The Problem of Defensive
Medicine, 200 Sci. 879, 879 (1978). Practiced positively, defensive medicine entails the use
of diagnostic or therapeutic measures to protect physicians from being held liable for medi-
cal malpractice. Id. Ty'pically, positive defensive medicine is unnecessary for the proper
treatment of patients 'and may expose the patient to the risk of adverse effects from the
procedure itself. Id. Practiced negatively, defensive medicine entails the withholding of
diagnostic or therapeutic techniques that might be medically justified but that involve more
than the usual risk of adverse effects and thus could serve as the basis for a medical mal-
practice claim. Id. By denying patients a potentially beneficial diagnosis or treatment,
physicians may provide suboptimal medical care. Id. But see Nathan Hershey, The Defen-
sive Practice of Medicine: Myth or Reality, 50 MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND Q. 69, 73 (1972)
("The problem in studying the phenomenon of the defensive practice of medicine is that
not all of the practices motivated by liability considerations result in poor-quality medical
care. It is, therefore, difficult to draw the line between where good medicine stops and
defensive practice begins.").
64. Roger A. Reynolds et al., The Cost of Medical Professional Liability, 257 JAMA
2776, 2776 (1987); see also AM. MEDICAL ASS'N SPECIAL TASK FORCE ON PROFESSIONAL
LIAB. AND INS., PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY IN THE '80s: REPORT 1, 3 (1984) (noting that the
practice of defensive medicine may add $15 billion to $40 billion annually to health care
costs). But see Project, The Medical Malpractice Threat: A Study of Defensive Medicine,
1971 DUKE L.J. 939, 943 (challenging the validity of the charge that physicians react to the
increased threat of malpractice actions by practicing defensive medicine); Terese Hudson,
Insurance & Liability: Experts Disagree Over the Cost of Defensive Medicine, HOSPITALS,
Aug. 5, 1990, at 74, 74 (noting that "[s]ome ... doubt that defensive medicine'adds signifi-
cantly to health care costs").
65. See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: SIX STATE
CASE STUDIES SHOW CLAIMS AND INSURANCE COSTS STILL RISE DESPITE REFORMS 17
(1986) (noting that in some states one claim is filed for every three or four physicians);
PATRICIA M. DANZON, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: THEORY, EVIDENCE, AND PUBLIC POL-
ICY 60 (1985) (noting that a survey from 1968 to 1975 indicated that the ratio of claims to
physicians jumped from one claim per thirty-seven physicians to one claim per eight
physicians).
66. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT OF THE TORT POLICY WORKING GROUP
ON THE CAUSES, EXTENT AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE CURRENT CRISIS IN INSUR-
ANCE AVAILABILITY AND AFFORDABILITY 35-36 (1986) (finding that during the ten-year
period ending 1985, the average medical malpractice jury award increased from $220,018 to
$1,017,716).
67. See, e.g., GAO MALPRACTICE REPORT, supra note 57, at 3 (noting that the cost of
medical malpractice insurance has increased from $1.7 billion in 1983 to $5.9 billion in 1988
for physicians and from $800 million in 1983 to $1.3 billion in 1985 for hospitals).
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costs either charge their patients higher fees68 or stop providing high-risk
services altogether.69 The latter prospect is especially troublesome in
Maine's rural areas, where residents receive minimal health care
services.7 °
Not surprisingly, Maine's practice parameters project was part of a tort
reform package that the Legislature passed in 1990.71 The legislation es-
tablishing the Project was drafted by the MMA in 1989 and sponsored in
1990 by an MMA ally in the Maine Senate.72 The Project's premise is
that physicians cannot be expected to alter their treatment patterns with-
out receiving some protection from liability for doing so. 73 The Project
also presumes that immunizing physicians from liability for practicing
medicine in accordance with the practice parameters will reduce the cost
of defensive medicine.74 Theoretically, if the practice parameters apply
to the clinical circumstances at issue, there will be a corresponding de-
crease in the likelihood of iatrogenic harm and a corresponding increase
in the overall quality of medical care provided. 71
Although no committee reports were produced on the Project,76 the
68. See, e.g., NAT'L LEADERSHIP COMM'N ON HEALTH CARE, FOR THE HEALTH OF A
NATION XXVii (1989).
69. See, e.g., AM. COLLEGE OF OBSTETRICIANS AND GYNECOLOGISTS, PROFESSIONAL
LIABILITY AND ITS EFFECTS: REPORT OF 1987 SURVEY OF AMERICAN COLLEGE OF OB-
STETRICIANS AND GYNECOLOGISTS MEMBERSHIP (1988); Dana Hughes et al., Obstetrical
Care for Low-Income Women: The Effects of Medical Malpractice on Community Health
Centers, in MEDICAL PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY IN THE DELIVERY OF OBSTETRICAL CARE
59 (Victoria P. Rostow & Roger J. Bulger eds., vol. II 1989).
70. Telephone interview with Gordon H. Smith, supra note 6.
71. An Act to Establish the Rural Medical Access Program, the 5-year Medical Liabil-
ity Demonstration Project, Revise the Rules Regarding Collateral Sources and the Discov-
ery Rule In Medical Liability Cases Without Imposing Caps On Damages, ch. 931, § 4,
1989 Me. Laws 2398, 2399-402 (codified at ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 2971-78 (West
Supp. 1991)) (establishing five-year medical liability demonstration project). The legisla-
tive package also created a rural medical access program to subsidize obstetrical care in
under-served areas, id. § 5, at 2402-04 (codified at ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, §§ 6301-
11 (West Supp. 1991)), revised Maine's discovery rules so that a medical malpractice pre-
litigation screening panel's findings are binding in a subsequent court action unless good
cause is shown, id. § 2, at 2398 (codified at ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2857(3) (West
Supp. 1991)), and revised Maine's collateral source rule so that a trial court must automati-
cally reduce an award by the amount of any collateral source payments, id. § 3, at 2398-99
(codified at ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2906 (West Supp. 1991)).
72. Smith, supra note 11, at 2.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Leahy, supra note 22, at 1491.
76. Letter from Jane Edwards, Reference Librarian, State Law Library, Augusta,
Maine (Sept. 1992) (on file with The Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy).
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floor debate on the tort reform legislation in the Maine House highlights
some of the policy issues that the legislators considered regarding the de-
velopment of the practice parameters.77 The parameters were to be con-
sistent with appropriate standards of medical care and designed to help
minimize future medical malpractice actions and the cost of defensive
medicine.78 In addition, the parameters were to be formulated to help
reduce the costly battle of experts that often occurs in medical malprac-
tice actions. 79 Generally, the legislators' remarks were supportive of the
Project and its objectives,8 although one indirect aspersion was cast upon
the practice parameters by a critic of the legislation's collateral source
provision.81 Nevertheless, the Legislature enacted the Project and the
Governor signed it into law on April 24, 1990.82
Thus, the Project's starting point is the development of practice param-
eters that define appropriate clinical indications for certain medical treat-
ments. As such, the practice parameters are a means of using health care
resources more efficiently, discouraging the practice of defensive
medicine, improving the quality of medical care, reducing the incidence
of iatrogenic harm, and rationalizing medical malpractice litigation.
II. DEVELOPMENT AND ADOPTION OF THE PRACTICE PARAMETERS
A. The Medical Specialty Advisory Committees
A perfect medical policymaking body would be absolutely objective,
well funded, well informed, composed of the finest experts, and commit-
ted to improving the quality and affordability of health care.8 3 In reality,
practice parameters are conceptualized as the product of one of two poli-
cymaking models.8 4 Under the professional model, practice parameters
77. 114TH MAINE LEGISLATURE, LEGIs. REC. H756-70 (Apr. 14, 1990) [hereinafter
LEGIS. REC.]. The Maine Senate passed the tort reform legislation without debate. Id. at
S837.
78. See, e.g., id. at H756 (statement of Rep. Rydell); id. at H757 (statement of Rep.
Paradis); id. at H767 (statement of Rep. Farnsworth).
79. See, e.g., id. at H756 (statement of Rep. Rydell).
80. See, e.g., id. at H760 (statement of Rep. Boutilier); id. at H761 (statement of Rep.
Hastings); id. at H766 (statement of Rep. Stevens); id. at H769 (statement of Rep.
Boutilier).
81. "[T]he demonstration project ... [is] just [a] nice little shady grove[ ] around that
dinosaur [the collateral source language] that is buried inside there, that [insurance compa-
nies and physicians] ... have been trying to get through this body and the other body for
ten years." Id. at H762 (statement of Rep. Conley).
82. Smith, supra note 11, at 1.
83. E.g., Leahy, supra note 22, at 1510.
84. Clark C. Havighurst, Practice Guidelines For Medical Care: The Policy Rationale,
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are developed according to professional norms that combine scientific
knowledge and an overarching dedication to patient welfare.8 5 This
model provides that practice parameters should be promulgated by physi-
cians" and should accommodate medicine's full range of practice diver-
sity rather than setting hard and fast prescriptions.87 By contrast, under
the political model, parties outside the medical profession join those
within it to develop practice parameters.88 This model affords the oppor-
tunity to build a consensus, both scientific and political, regarding what
medical care is appropriate for society.89
That the Project is based on the political model is clear from the mem-
bership of the medical specialty advisory committees (Advisory Commit-
tees) that are responsible for developing the practice parameters. 90
Appointments to the Advisory Committees are made primarily by the
Maine Board of Registration in Medicine, but the Governor and the lead-
ers of the Legislature also appoint certain members, with the MMA and
several medical specialty societies serving an advisory role.91 These soci-
eties include the Maine Chapter of the American Society of Anesthesiol-
ogists, the Maine Osteopathic Association, the Maine College of Family
Physicians, the Maine Chapter of the American College of Emergency
Medicine Physicians, the Maine Academy of Family Physicians, the
Maine Chapter of the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecolo-
gists, and the Maine Radiological Society.92
The Advisory Committees93 worked under the following legislative
34 ST. Louis U. L.J. 777, 783-88 (1990). A third, non-regulatory model is based on the
economic theory that practice parameters are a public good that warrant public sponsor-
ship. Id. at 794-800. This model argues for government control of the promulgation of
practice parameters on a decentralized and pluralistic basis. Id. at 800-16. Thus, practice
parameters could help deregulate the health care industry by expanding the ability of con-
sumers to specify what they do and do not wish to purchase in the health care market.
Havighurst, supra note 22, at 88. Increased consumer choice would permit a shift in the
legal basis of medical malpractice liability from tort to contract-"from a form of com-
mand-and-control regulation to consumer choice." Id.
85. Havighurst, supra note 84, at 784.
86. See Leahy, supra note 22, at 1510-13 (arguing that medical societies are best suited
to promulgate practice parameters).
87. Havighurst, supra note 84, at 785.
88. Id. at 786-87.
89. Id. at 787-88.
90. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2972(2)(A)-(D) (West Supp. 1991).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Advisory Committee members must have an interest in and a knowledge of their
panel's specialty area. Id. The Advisory Committees on anesthesiology and radiology
have six members each: one physician who practices in a tertiary hospital; one physician
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mandate:
Each medical specialty advisory committee shall develop
practice parameters and risk management protocols in the medi-
cal specialty area relating to that committee. The practice pa-
rameters must define appropriate clinical indications and
methods of treatment within that specialty. The risk manage-
ment protocols must establish standards of practice designed to
avoid malpractice claims and increase the defensibility of the,
malpractice claims that are pursued. The parameters and proto-
cols must be consistent with appropriate standards of care and
levels of quality.94
The Advisory Committees studied medical literature, consulted medical
experts, analyzed medical malpractice liability claims data, examined the
standards of national medical specialty societies in their respective fields,
and considered other sources of relevant information.95  Committee
members then agreed to focus on medical procedures that represented a
significant drain on health care dollars.96
For example, members of the Advisory Committee on anesthesiology
"looked at instances that were relatively rare but caused a lot of money
who practices in a medium-sized hospital; one physician who practices primarily in a rural
area; one physician who is board-certified in the specialty; and two public members who
represent the interests of consumers and payers of medical costs, respectively. Id.
§ 2972(2)(A), (D). The Advisory Committee on emergency medicine has nine members:
one physician who practices in a tertiary hospital; an osteopath; one physician who prac-
tices primarily in a rural area; one family practice physician; two physicians who are board-
certified in the specialty; and three public members who represent the interests of consum-
ers, payers of medical costs, and allied health professionals, respectively. Id. § 2972(2)(B).
The allied health professional seat is held by a nurse with extensive risk management expe-
rience. Smith, supra note 11, at 3. Finally, the Advisory Committee on obstetrics and
gynecology also has nine members: one physician who practices in a tertiary hospital; one
physician who practices in a medium-sized hospital; one physician who practices primarily
in a rural area; one family practice physician; one physician who is board-certified in the
specialty; and three public members who represent the interests of consumers, payers of
medical costs, and allied health professionals, respectively. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24,
§ 2972(C) (West Supp. 1991). The allied health professional seat is filled by a certified
nurse mid-wife. Smith, supra note 11, at 3.
94. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2973 (West Supp. 1991).
95. Code Me. R. §§ 02-373-020 at 3, -022 at 3, -024 at 4, -026 at 3 (1991). The Advisory
Committees studied medical malpractice claims data to identify effective strategies that
would help reduce iatrogenic harm. See Richard L. Kravitz et al., Malpractice Claims Data
as a Quality Control Tool, 266 JAMA 2087 (1991) (finding that medical malpractice claims
in the high-risk specialties of obstetrics and gynecology, anesthesiology, general surgery,
and radiology were caused by patient management errors rather than substandard techni-
cal performance or medical staff coordination problems).
96. Stephenson, supra note 56, at 5.
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payouts."97 They also "looked at things that were done very frequently
but were relatively low-cost items. In particular, . . [they] examined in-
appropriate preoperative lab tests anesthesiologists might order. 918 The
Advisory Committee on obstetrics and gynecology "took a similar ap-
proach in deciding where to focus its standards."99 The members of the
Advisory Committee on emergency medicine also focused on the "al-
leged excessive use of diagnostic procedures in the emergency room."
°°
By focusing on unusual payment and utilization rates, the Advisory Com-
mittees sought to identify when physicians weie practicing defensive
medicine.'' Their theory was that if the practice parameters were devel-
oped for those medical procedures commonly used to practice defensive
medicine, the cost and incidence of defensive medicine would be
reduced.02
In formulating the practice parameters, the Advisory Committees bor-
rowed heavily from standards and guidelines of national medical specialty
societies.'0 3 For example, the Advisory Committee on anesthesiology
stated that it derived its practice parameters from standards and guide-
lines of the American Society of Anesthesiologists.' ° Likewise, the Ad-
visory Committee on obstetrics and gynecology borrowed from the
technical bulletins, committee opinions, and quality assurance manuals of
the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, and from the
clinical standards of the Harvard Medical Institutions and the University
of Connecticut Regional Network.'0 5 The Advisory Committee on emer-
97. Id. (quoting Richard M. Flowerdew, M.D., chairperson of the Advisory Commit-
tee on anesthesiology) (internal quotations omitted).
98. Id.
99. Id. (paraphrasing remarks of John Makin, M.D., chairperson of the Advisory
Committee on obstetrics and gynecology).
100. Smith, supra note 11, at 2.
101. See supra notes 25-26, 38, 63 and accompanying text.
102. Smith, supra note 11, at 2. But see William B. Schwartz & Paul L. Joskow, Medical
Efficacy Versus Economic Efficiency: A Conflict in Values, 299 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1462
(1978) (arguing that health care costs cannot be controlled without confronting the fact
that the best health care technology can provide frequently must be foregone to achieve
economic efficiency).
103. Stephenson, supra note 56, at 1.
104. Code Me. R. § 02-373-020 app. 1 at 1 (1991).
105. Id. § 02-373-024 app. 1 at 1-15. The Advisory Committee on obstetrics and gyne-
cology also went beyond national standards. For example, the Advisory Committee devel-
oped a practice parameter for monitoring intrapartum fetal distress. Id. at 9-13. "ACOG
[American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists] has no comparable document.
While fetal distress is a widely used term, it is poorly defined .... [The Advisory
C]ommittee defined fetal distress in terms of the timing and duration of symptoms related
to fetal heart rate." Stephenson, supra note 56, at 6 (quoting John Makin, M.D., chairper-
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gency medicine formulated its practice parameter on inter-hospital pa-
tient transfers' 0 6 from federal guidelines set forth in the Consolidated
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985.107 Although the Project's
practice parameters "are based on and strongly related to the national
standards, . . . they are not necessarily identical.' 10 8 Many parameters
were tailored "to fit the realities of the Maine health care environ-
ment."10 9 It is unlikely, however, that this tailoring amounts to a return
to the locality standard of medical care under the law of negligence. In-
deed, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court's decision in Johnson v. Ger-
rish" holds medical specialists to a national standard of care, and under
McLaughlin v. Sy,"' local circumstances are relegated to a mere factor in
the overall determination of the legal standard of appropriate medical
care.
The practice parameters 1 2 may be used for diagnosis, screening, or
treatment.1 3 The ease with which a parameter can be assimilated into
the standard of care depends upon the practice parameter's classifica-
tion." 4 First, diagnostic practice parameters include medical tests that
help "determine the presence or absence of specific disorders in [pa-
tients] ... with unique complaints or clinical findings. '""' Whether a phy-
sician employs a particular diagnostic test depends upon his or her
analysis of many clinical facts, such as the degree of the patient's illness
and the likely effect of one test on another or on the patient's current
medical situation.'1 6 Second, screening practice parameters describe tests
that are performed on healthy individuals who belong to specified
son of the Advisory Committee on obstetrics and gynecology) (internal quotations
omitted).
106. Code Me. R. § 02-373-022 app. 1 at 2-4 (1991).
107. Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-272,
§ 9121, 100 Stat. 82, 164-67 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395).
108. Stephenson, supra note 56, at 4 (quoting Gordon H. Smith, counsel for the Maine
Medical Association) (internal quotations omitted). However, the practice parameters for
radiology are virtually identical to the standards and guidelines already developed by the
American College of Radiology. Id. at 6.
109. Id. at 4 (quoting Gordon H. Smith, counsel for the Maine Medical Association)
(internal quotations omitted).
110. 518 A.2d 721, 722-23 (Me. 1986); see supra note 15.
111. 589 A.2d 448, 452 (Me. 1991); see supra note 15.
112. See supra note 4.
113. Leahy, supra note 22, at 1492.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
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classes."17 For example, the Project provides that asymptomatic women
at least forty years of age are candidates for periodic mammography."1
8
Because they are generally independent of the clinical variations among
individual patients, screening parameters are easier to assimilate into a
legal standard of care than diagnostic parameters." 9 Finally, treatment
practice parameters share the characteristics found in the other two
classes of parameters but encompass even more clinical variables; there-
fore, treatment parameters are broadly drawn and difficult to assimilate
into a workable legal standard of care.'
B. The Maine Board of Registration in Medicine
The Advisory Committees formulated draft versions of the practice pa-
rameters and sent them for comments to all physicians in Maine practic-
ing in the respective specialty areas.' On February 14,.1991, l22 pursuant
to the rulemaking requirements of the Maine Administrative Procedure
Act, 23 the Board of Registration in Medicine (Board)' 24 held public
hearings on the preliminary drafts of the parameters.25 The Board con-
sidered written commentary to clarify technical language in the practice
parameters and the requirements for eligibility for participation in the
Project.'2 6 Except for the chairpersons of the Advisory Committees, who
spoke in favor of adopting the practice parameters as administrative
rules, no other parties spoke either for or against the practice parame-
ters. 127 At the conclusion of the rulemaking process, 128 the Board
adopted the practice parameters as administrative rules, 29 thereby giving
117. Id.
118. Code Me. R. § 02-373-026 app. 1 at 2 (1991).
119. Leahy, supra note 22, at 1493.
120. Id. at 1494. As more data on the outcomes of treatments in particular clinical
circumstances is collected, the medical profession will use it to build a consensus on the
appropriate treatment for those clinical circumstances, and treatment practice parameters
will become more specific. Id.
121. Stephenson, supra note 56, at 5.
122. Code Me. R. §§ 02-373-020 at 4, -022 at 4, -024 at 4 (1991).
123. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 8052 (West 1989 & Supp. 1991).
124. See supra note 5.
125. No public testimony was heard on the practice parameters for radiology because
the Board received no requests to hold hearings on the work of the Advisory Committee
on radiology. Code Me. R. § 02-373-026 at 4 (1991).
126. Id. §§ 02-373-020 at 4, -022 at 4-5, -024 at 4-5, -026 at 4.
127. Id. §§ 02-373-020 at 4, -022 at 4, -024 at 4, -026 at 4.
128. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 8052 (West Supp. 1991).
129. Code Me. R. §§ 02-373-020 at 3, -022 at 3, -024 at 3-4, -026 at 3 (1991).
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them the force and effect of law.130
A statement of the factual and policy bases for the practice parameters
accompanies the Board's rules.131 The Board stated that the parameters
are consistent with appropriate standards of medical care and levels of
quality in the practice of anesthesiology, emergency medicine, obstetrics
and gynecology, and radiology in the State of Maine. 32 The Board in-
tends that physicians participating in the Project conform their care of
patients to the practice parameters whenever medically appropriate. 33
Hopefully, such conformity will reduce the risk of iatrogenic injury to
patients and the cost of defending medical malpractice claims. While the
Board found that the practice parameters define appropriate standards of
care, the physician's assertion that the parameters apply to a particular
case is rebuttable. 3
The need for flexibility in applying the practice parameters is evident in
the Board's additional finding that "[u]nder extenuating circumstances, it
may not be medically appropriate to follow these practice parameters.' 35
In exchange for clinical discretion, the Board requires stringent documen-
tation by participating physicians for care provided outside the parame-
ters.136 Physicians must timely document the patient's medical record,
130. See supra note 5. The Maine Trial Lawyers Association criticized the adoption of
the practice parameters as administrative rules because future changes will also have to
satisfy the procedural requirements of the Maine Administrative Procedure Act. Stephen-
son, supra note 56, at 6. The practice parameters will not "have the fluidity that one nor-
mally attributes to medical standards. Under this condition [of adopting the practice
parameters as administrative rules], the standards will be carved in stone and will have to
be followed by physicians like a recipe." Id. (quoting Robert Stolt, counsel for the Maine
Trial Lawyers Association) (internal quotations omitted). Nonetheless, according to the
chairperson of the Advisory Committee on anesthesiology, the practice parameters "are
dynamic .... They will change, they should change, and they must change." Id. (quoting
Richard M. Flowerdew, M.D., chairperson of the Advisory Committee on anesthesiology)
(internal quotations omitted). Periodic meetings of the Advisory Committees, medical
literature reviews, and solicitation of comments will provide the basis for updating the
practice parameters to reflect advances in medical knowledge. Id. If the Advisory Com-
mittees conclude that changes are appropriate, recommendations will be made to the
Board or the Legislature. Id.
131. The Maine Administrative Procedure Act requires the Board to adopt this state-
ment. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 8052(5) (West 1989 & Supp. 1991).
132. Code Me. R. §§ 02-373-020 at 3, -022 at 3, -024 at 3, -026 at 3 (1991).
133. Id. §§ 02-373-020 at 3, -022 at 3, -024 at 3, -026 at 3.
134. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2975(1)-(3) (West Supp. 1991); see supra notes 7-11
and accompanying text.
135. Code Me. R. § 02-373-020 app. 1 at 1; see id. §§ 02-373-022 app. 1 at 1, -024 app. 1
at 1, -026 app. 1 at 1 (1991).
136. Stephenson, supra note 56, at 5. According to the chairperson of the Advisory
Committee on anesthesiology, the practice parameters "are not so different in mandating
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describing any deviation from a parameter and explaining the reasons
therefor.'37 The Advisory Committee on radiology described the ration-
ale for the compromise between the practice parameters and clinical dis-
cretion as follows:
It is the opinion of the committee-that these practice parame-
ters, so defined and developed, define principles of practice
which should generally produce high quality radiological care.
The radiologist may exceed an existing standard as determined
by the individual patient and available resources. The standards
should not be deemed inclusive of all proper methods of care or
exclusive of other methods of care reasonably directed to ob-
taining the same results. The ultimate judgment regarding the
propriety of any specific procedure or course of conduct must be
made by the radiologist in light of all circumstances presented
by the individual situation. Adherence to these standards will
not assure successful outcome [sic] in every situation."' 8
Although this statement assumes that the physician is treating the pa-
tient pursuant to the practice parameters, the Project does not require
physicians to use the parameters. 139 Because the parameters have the
force and effect of law, such a requirement would create absolutely bind-
ing standards of medical care."4 Requiring physicians to use the parame-
ters would be imprudent due to the highly complex and variable nature of
medicine. 4' For the practice parameters' to be obligatory on the physi-
cian, complete clarity regarding the parameters application to clinical sit-
uations would be required, 42 and achieving that degree of exactness is
unlikely. Moreover, if the parameters were strictly binding, physicians
what physicians do, but in their obligation to record what they do." Id. (quoting Richard
M. Flowerdew, M.D.) (internal quotations omitted). Because physicians who participate in
the Project may deviate from them, the practice parameters are not like "cookbook
medicine." Id. Although allowing for clinical discretion may remove the taint of "cook-
book medicine," such flexibility also may affect the usefulness of the practice parameters
as a defense in medical malpractice actions. See Smith, supra note 11, at 5 (questioning
whether the Advisory Committees can devise practice parameters that are both sufficiently
general to gain acceptance by the Maine medical profession and specific and narrow
enough to be useful in the defense of medical malpractice claims).
137. Code Me. R. §§ 02-373-020 app. 1 at 1, -022 app. 1 at 1, -024 app. 1 at 1, -026 app. 1
at 1 (1991).
138. Id. § 02-373-026 app. 1 at 1.
139. It is the "desire" of the Board that the physicians who are participating in the
Project will conform their care of patients to the practice parameters. Id. §§ 02-373-020 at
3, -022 at 3, -024 at 4, -026 at 3.
140. See supra note 5.
141. See Hall, supra note 11, at 134.
142. Id.
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pleading compliance with parameters as an affirmative defense to mal-
practice claims would enjoy virtual tort immunity, an objectionable result
given the complexities and ambiguities of medicine. 43 On the other
hand, failure to comply exactly with compulsory parameters would raise
the specter of negligence per se,' 44 regardless of Maine's rule that viola-
tion of a statute is only evidence of negligence and not negligence per
se.145 Thus, the practice parameters shield a physician from liability only
if appropriately employed and followed.
Physician discretion regarding the use of the parameters raises the is-
sue of whether the parameters can influence physicians' treatment deci-
sions. Merely providing physicians with practice parameters is generally
regarded as inadequate to bring about the desired medical improve-
ments.' 46  Physicians need incentives to integrate practice parameters
into their daily clinical practice. 47 Whether physicians use the parame-
ters also depends upon the quality of the practice parameters in terms of
143. Id.
144. Havighurst, supra note 22, at 105 (arguing that "any injury-causing violation of a
practice guideline is very likely to be treated by a jury as negligence per se even if it is not
regarded as such in law").
145. Dongo v. Banks, 448 A.2d 885, 889 (Me. 1982) (citing Jones v. Billings, 289 A.2d
39, 41 (Me. 1972)).
146. E.g., Chassin, supra note 1, at 439.
147. A study of hospitals and obstetricians in Ontario, Canada before and after the
release of a widely distributed and nationally endorsed consensus statement that recom-
mended decreases in the use of cesarean sections highlights the importance of incentives.
Jonathan Lomas et al., Do Practice Guidelines Guide Practice?, 321 NEW ENG. J. MED.
1306 (1989). The study found that "the practices of physicians are influenced by many
things besides research evidence, even when such evidence is packaged in a set of clear and
concrete recommendations." Id. at 1310. Implementation of practice parameters may be
blocked by "perceived threats of malpractice litigation from potentially dissatisfied par-
ents,. . . economic and socioeconomic incentives to perform elective cesarean section[,] ...
or even pressure from women who were offered the opportunity to avoid a potentially
painful and prolonged vaginal delivery." Id. Without strategies to overcome these other
influences, "the dissemination of... practice guidelines.., is unlikely to have much effect
on inappropriate practices that are sustained by powerful nonscientific forces." Id. The
anesthesia quality assurance program in Massachusetts is an example of economic incen-
tives causing the integration of practice parameters into clinical practice. Leape, supra
note 3, at 44. In July 1987, the Commonwealth's Medical Malpractice Joint Underwriting
Association (JUA) established a quality assurance program based on the practice parame-
ters of the American Society of Anesthesiologists (ASA). Id. The JUA, the only under-
writer of medical malpractice insurance in Massachusetts, discounted premiums for
physicians who participated in the program. Kinney, supra note 19, at 25. A year after
initiating the program, "the JUA reported that for the first time, no episodes of hypoxic
brain damage had occurred during the year in patients for whom the anesthetists had fol-
lowed the ASA guidelines." Leape, supra note 3, at 44. The JUA thereafter announced a
20% reduction in malpractice insurance fees for participating physicians. Id.
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their clarity and clinical relevance.' 48 Under the Maine Project, physi-
cians have several strong incentives to utilize the practice parameters in
clinical practice.
One incentive is that physicians will have the benefit of a known medi-
cal standard "that cannot be challenged by experts within or outside the
State [of Maine]."' 49 Thus, the plaintiff will be forced to focus on
whether the practice parameters applied to the clinical circumstances or
whether the physician complied with them.' Physicians still may be vul-
nerable if compliance implicates questions of judgment and discretion.'
Another incentive is that compliance with the parameters is an affirma-
tive defense for a physician who is sued for medical malpractice. Only
the physician may introduce the parameters as evidence at trial, 52 and if
the physician does not introduce the parameters, their existence will not
arise in the litigation.' 53 However, the physician's compliance with the
parameters is subject to attack once the affirmative defense is raised. 54
A third incentive is that the physician's alternative to invoking the param-
eters is the unsatisfactory system of a jury determination of the standard
of care based on a battle of experts.' 55 A fourth incentive is that the
parameters do not threaten the physician's clinical judgment and discre-
tion.'56 Finally, peer pressure among physicians is likely to influence util-
ization of the parameters. 57 "[T]he physicians all had a hand in writing
or reviewing the standards .... Maine physicians had the final say in de-
veloping their own standards."' 5 8
In sum, the practice parameters reflect a variety of interests in Maine
148. See Robert H. Brook, Practice Guidelines and Practicing Medicine: Are They
Compatible?, 262 JAMA 3027, 3027 (1989).
149. Smith, supra note 11, at 3.
150. Telephone interview with Gordon H. Smith, supra note 6.
151. Hall, supra note 11, at 134.
152. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2975(1)-(2) (West Supp. 1991).
153. Smith, supra note 11, at 4.
154. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2975(2) (West Supp. 1991).
155. The legal principles that establish the standard of care in a medical malpractice
action can be conceptualized as a triangle. Hirshfeld, supra note 11, at 1559. The broadest
rule, which governs all individual conduct, comprises the triangle's base. Id. The court
supplies narrower rules to build up the sides, as a matter of law, and the litigants further
shape the result through competing evidence elicited in the "battle of experts." Id. At the
apex of the triangle is the specific legal standard of care for the particular case. Id. The
jury completes the triangle at this point. Id.
156. See Code Me. R. §§ 02-373-020 app. 1 at 1, -022 app. 1 at 1, -024 app. 1 at 1, -026
app. 1 at 1 (1991).
157. Leape, supra note 3, at 45.
158. Stephenson, supra note 56, at 4.
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both within and outside the medical community. They are the product of
extensive scientific investigation into certain misutilized medical proce-
dures. The parameters are rooted in standards and guidelines of national
medical specialty societies, but also fit the realities of practicing medicine
in the State of Maine. The parameters are consistent with appropriate
standards of care and levels of quality in the practice of the respective
medical specialty areas in the state. Finally, they have the force and ef-
fect of law as administrative rules, and several strong incentives support
their use in clinical practice.
III. PRACTICE PARAMETERS AS EVIDENCE OF THE STANDARD OF
CARE
A. The Maine Rules of Evidence
To assert an affirmative defense based on the practice parameters in a
medical malpractice action, the physician must introduce the parameters
into evidence as proof of the standard of care under the clinical circum-
stances being litigated. 159 Of course, any proffer of evidentiary proof is
subject to the rules of evidence."6 Since "only the physician . . . may
introduce into evidence... the existence of the practice parameters," the
burden of satisfying these evidentiary requirements is on the physician. 61
In general, the physician must prove three evidentiary points: (1) that the
practice parameters are relevant to the clinical circumstances at issue; 162
(2) that the parameters are admissible as evidence despite the rule against
hearsay;' 63 and (3) that the parameters are authentic representations of
what they purport to be."6 Of particular importance to the physician's
successful use of the affirmative defense is the deference that Maine
courts give the practice parameters. 65
Evidence is relevant if it has "any tendency to make the existence of
any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence."' 66 If,
for example, the clinical indications for a medical procedure are at issue,
the physician must demonstrate that the practice parameters address
159. Hirshfeld, supra note 11, at 1556.
160. JOHN W. STRONG ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 1, at 2 (4th ed. 1992).
161. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2975(2) (West Supp. 1991).
162. ME. R. EVID. 402.
163. ME. R. EVID. 802.
164. ME. R. EVID. 901.
165. See Brennan, supra note 11, at 77-78.
166. ME. R. EVID. 401.
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those clinical indications.167 If a standard of care itself is at issue, the
physician must prove that the parameters define the standard of care.168
Expert medical testimony will be required to establish the relevancy of
the practice parameters, and the physician will be required to qualify his
or her witness as a medical expert. 169 However, the key issue will be
whether the practice parameters apply to the facts of the case rather than
whether the practice parameters set forth valid standards of care. To
deny the physician the affirmative defense of compliance, the plaintiff
may argue that the parameters are irrelevant and inadmissible, 7 ° or may
assert that the physician's expert witness has an insufficient basis for ex-
pressing an opinion regarding the relevancy of the parameters.
17
Assuming that the practice parameters are relevant to the clinical cir-
cumstances at issue, the physician must further establish that the parame-
ters are admissible despite the hearsay rule.172 The parameters are
hearsay because they are out-of-court statements offered to prove the
truth of the matter asserted therein-namely, the standard of care.' 73
Hearsay is inadmissible' 74 because it cannot meet the three conditions
under which testimony is ordinarily received: oath, personal presence at
trial, and cross-examination.1 75 The physician, however, may be able to
introduce the parameters as evidence of the standard of care under cer-
tain exceptions to the hearsay rule.'7 6
One exception to the hearsay rule is for "learned treatises,' 77 which
are "statements contained in published treatises, periodicals, or pam-
phlets on a subject of ... medicine ... established as a reliable authority
by the testimony or admission of the witness or by other expert testimony
or by judicial notice."'7 8 However, the learned treatise exception has
167. Brennan, supra note 11, at 75.
168. Id.
169. ME. R. EvID. 702. See Kinney & Wilder, supra note 11, at 446 (noting that most
courts would not accept practice parameters as evidence of the standard of care without
accompanying expert medical testimony).
170. ME. R. EvID. 402.
171. ME. R. EvID. 705(b).
172. ME. R. EvID. 802.
173. ME. R. EVID. 801(c).
174. ME. R. EvID. 802.
175. STRONG ET AL., supra note 160, § 245, at 426.
176. ME. R. EVID. 803.
177. ME. R. EVID. 803(18).
178. Id. Maine courts are unlikely to take judicial notice of the practice parameters.
"A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either
(1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of
accurate and ready determination by resort to resources whose accuracy cannot reasonably
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several limitations. First, because expert testimony is required to estab-
lish the reliability of the treatise, the exception raises the problems of
witness credibility and battling experts. 79 Second, the treatise may be
read into evidence but may not be received as an exhibit. 80 Finally and
most importantly, the Maine hearsay exception for a learned treatise ap-
plies "[tlo the extent [the learned treatise is] called to the attention of an
expert witness upon cross-examination."'' The physician likely will also
want to introduce the practice parameters on direct examination of his or
her expert witness when seeking to establish the affirmative defensive of
compliance.' 8 2
The exception to the hearsay rule for public records and reports may
be more useful for Maine physicians.' 83 This exception covers "records,
reports, statements, or data compilations in any form of a public office or
agency setting forth ... matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by
law and as to which there was a duty to report, or factual findings result-
ing from an investigation made pursuant to authority granted by law."'"
The practice parameters appear to satisfy this definition as data compila-
tions or factual findings made by a public agency pursuant to statutory
authority.'85 Under this exception to the hearsay rule, offering the pa-
rameters as evidentiary exhibits or on direct examination is allowed. An-
other advantage to the public records and reports exception is that expert
testimony is not required to establish the materials as reliable author-
ity."'86 Thus, the hearsay exception for public records and reports offers
the physician more flexibility in using the practice parameters as evidence
than the hearsay exception for learned treatises.
be questioned." ME. R. EVID. 201(b). Another complication is that Maine courts can only
take judicial notice of adjudicative facts under Rule 201(a) of the Maine Rules of Evi-
dence, and the practice parameters are arguably legislative facts. See Kenneth C. Davis,
An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process, 55 HARV. L. REV.
364, 404-07 (1942) (distinguishing between adjudicative and legislative facts); see also
Leahy, supra note 22, at 1522-27 (arguing for the use of judicial notice to give legal force to
practice parameters based on procedural and substantive advantages).
179. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
180. ME. R. EVID. 803(18).
181. Id.
182. Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, the learned treatise exception applies "[t]o
the extent [the learned treatise is] called to the attention of an expert witness upon cross-
examination or relied upon by the expert witness in direct examination." FED. R. EVID.
803(18).
183. ME. R. EVID. 803(8)(A).
184. Id.
185. See supra note 5.
186. ME. R. EVID. 803(8)(A).
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The final evidentiary requirement is that the physician must demon-
strate that the practice parameters are what they purport to be.' 87 To
facilitate this identification, the physician may rely on the rule that extrin-
sic evidence of authenticity is not required for a document or certified
copy bearing both the seal of the State of Maine and a signature purport-
ing to be an attestation or execution.18 8 Because the law requires the
Secretary of State of Maine to make available copies of rules for all state
agencies,' 8 9 the practice parameters are self-authenticating, thus easing
their introduction as evidence at trial. 190
Practice parameters have been used in several cases as evidence of the
standard of care outside of Maine, but these precedents involved plain-
tiffs using practice parameters against physicians to prove medical mal-
practice.' 91 At present, there are no reported cases of physicians using
practice parameters defensively to prove due care in medical malpractice
actions. 92 When used to inculpate physicians, courts have refused to rely
on parameters on the issue of the standard of care.' 93 The lack of defer-
ence to parameters is defensible under such circumstances because plain-
tiffs can characterize physician conduct as negligent by strategically
selecting their practice parameters, and because physicians may be able
187. ME. R. EvID. 901(a).
188. ME. R. EvID. 902(1), (4).
189. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 8056(3)(A) (West 1989 & Supp. 1991).
190. ME. R. EvID. 902(4).
191. See, e.g., Bradford v. McGee, 534 So. 2d 1076, 1080-81 (Ala. 1988) (finding evi-
dence of negligence in failure to follow American College of Obstetricians and Gynecolo-
gists' practice parameter recommending that physicians perform fetal non-stress testing on
patients beginning in the 42nd week of pregnancy); James v. Woolley, 523 So. 2d 110, 112
(Ala. 1988) (finding evidence of negligence in failure to follow American College of Obste-
tricians and Gynecologists' practice parameter recommending that physicians deliver ba-
bies in excess of 4000g by cesarean section); Pollard v. Goldsmith, 572 P.2d 1201, 1203
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1977) (finding that the American College of Surgeons' practice parameter
on Prophylaxis Against Tetanus and Wound Management established a standard of care
for that condition); see also Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hosp., 211 N.E.2d
253 (II!. 1965) (finding that national hospital accreditation standards are relevant when
determining responsibilities of a hospital in its care of patients); Cornfeldt v. Tongen, 262
N.W.2d 684 (Minn. 1977) (finding the hospital accreditation standards of the Joint Com-
mission for the Accreditation of Hospitals admissible as evidence of accepted medical
practice in hospitals); Gwen M. Schockemoehl, Admissibility of Written Standards as Evi-
dence of the Standard of Care in Medical and Hospital Negligence Actions in Virginia, 18 U.
RICH. L. REV. 725 (1984) (arguing in favor of the admission of practice parameters to help
eliminate the elusiveness surrounding the standard of care concept).
192. See Hall, supra note 11, at 131. The Maine Medical Association expects a case
involving the defensive use of the practice parameters to arise within two to three years.
Telephone interview with Gordon H. Smith, supra note 6.
193. See Hall, supra note 11, at 131.
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to justify deviations from those parameters.194 However, when parame-
ters are used as an exculpatory defense, courts should defer on the issue
of the standard of care.' 95 Indeed, Maine courts have several important
policy reasons for instructing juries to defer to the practice parameters on
the issue of the standard of care.
B. Policy Considerations
First, the intended use of the practice parameters warrants judicial def-
erence. 196 The State Legislature mandated that the parameters be consis-
tent with appropriate standards of care and levels of quality in the
practice of anesthesiology, emergency medicine, gynecology and obstet-
rics, and radiology in Maine.197 Implementing this charge, the Board
found that physician compliance with the parameters would reduce the
risk of iatrogenic injury and the cost of defending medical malpractice
claims.' 9 Thus, the parameters are intended to improve medical care
and to control health care costs by prospectively prescribing the appropri-
ate standard of care for certain clinical indications. 99 When the clinical
indications covered by the parameters are at issue in medical malpractice
actions, the Maine courts should instruct juries that the practice parame-
ters define the standard of care.2" This instruction will also depend on
the practice parameters being prescriptive (instructing treatment for spe-
cific clinical indications prospectively) and precise (identifying when they
do and do not apply).2° ' Conversely, when the practice parameters and
the clinical indications at issue are not identical, the practice parameters
194. See id.
195. See Brennan, supra note 11, at 77 (arguing that compliance with practice parame-
ters by an individual practitioner "will be important, if not totally exculpatory, evidence in
a common law proceeding"); see also Hall, supra note 11, at 131 (arguing that "because it
in not necessary for a doctor to show that unanimous professional consensus supports his
[or her] conduct, a defense is sufficiently established if the doctor shows only that ... [he or
she] complied with at least one respectable body of opinion").
196. See Hirshfeld, supra note 11, at 1559-60 (noting that compliance with practice pa-
rameters can be a significant factor in determining the standard of care); Kinney & Wilder,
supra note 11, at 447-48 (noting that protocols or standards developed by national medical
organizations can be persuasive evidence on the issue of compliance with the appropriate
standard of care).
197. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2973 (West Supp. 1991).
198. Code Me. R. §§ 02-373-020 at 3, -022 at 3, -024 at 4, -026 at 3 (1991).
199. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
200. See Hirshfeld, supra note 11, at 1560; Kinney & Wilder, supra note 11, at 447.
201. See Deborah W. Garnick et al., Can Practice Guidelines Reduce the Number and
Costs of Malpractice Claims?, 266 JAMA 2856, 2859 (1991); Hall, supra note 11, at 142-43;
Hirshfeld, supra note 11, at 1560.
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are due less deference as evidence of the standard of care.2°2
Second, the sponsorship of the practice parameters supports judicial
deference.20 3 The membership of the Advisory Committees that devel-
oped the parameters reflects not only the prestige and imprimatur of the
Maine medical profession-physicians, allied health professionals, and
state chapters of national medical specialty societies-but also the inter-
ests of consumers and third-party payers.20 4 Maine physicians "had the
final say in developing their own [practice parameters] .... [The physi-
cians] tailored many of them to fit the realities of the Maine health care
environment., 20 5 Thus, the Maine medical profession's approval of the
parameters is clear. In addition, the parameters were promulgated by the
Maine Board of Registration in Medicine, which has the legal duty to
regulate the practice of medicine in the state.2° .Most importantly, the
practice parameters express what the citizens of the State of Maine deem
to be appropriate standards of medical care.20 7
Finally, the character of the practice parameters argues for judicial def-
erence.208 The parameters reflect Advisory Committee studies of medi-
cal literature, consultations with medical and scientific experts, analyses
of medical malpractice liability claims data, examinations of the standards
of national medical specialty societies, and consultations with other rele-
vant sources.209 Furthermore, the parameters are related to national
medical specialty society guidelines that other courts have considered as
evidence of the standard of care.210 As Board promulgated administra-
tive rules, the parameters also have the force and effect of law.211 The
fact that physician compliance with the practice parameters is not com-
pulsory is wise public policy 212 and does not undermine their validity as
202. See Hall, supra note 11, at 143; Hirshfeld, supra note 11, at 1560.
203. See Garnick et al., supra note 201, at 2858-59; Hall, supra note 11, at 140-42; Kin-
ney & Wilder, supra note 11, at 448-49.
204. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2972(2)(A)-(D) (West Supp. 1991).
205. Stephenson, supra note. 56, at 4 (quoting Gordon H. Smith, counsel, Maine Medi-
cal Association) (internal quotations omitted).
206. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 3269 (West 1988 & Supp. 1991).
207. See supra notes 90-93 and accompanying text.
208. See Kinney & Wilder, supra note 11, at 449-50 (stating that "too much deference is
accorded to custom evidence in medical malpractice").
209. Code Me. R. §§ 02-373-020 at 3, -022 at 3, -024 at 4, -026 at 3 (1991).
210. See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
211. See Hirshfeld, supra note 11, at 1560 (arguing that legislative statutes and govern-
ment regulations may affect the evidentiary weight of practice parameters).
212. See supra notes 139-145 and accompanying text.
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appropriate standards of medical care.213 Obligatory use of the parame-
ters regardless of any unique clinical circumstances may very well in-
crease the incidence of iatrogenic injury, contrary to the aims of the
Project.2" 4 Maine physicians, however, have several strong incentives for
incorporating the parameters into their clinical practice whenever appro-
priate.215 Maine courts should encourage physician utilization of the
practice parameters because they define "good medical practice. '216
IV. CONCLUSION
"[I]f the program succeeds in Maine, it will serve as a compelling argu-
ment for broadening the use of standards elsewhere in the nation." '217
Maine courts can contribute to the Project's success by instructing juries
that, where applicable and followed, the practice parameters define the
standard of care. This judicial deference is justified in terms of the pur-
pose, broad societal support, and medical and scientific validity of the
practice parameters. Thus, the Maine judiciary can bolster the Project's
efforts to use health care resources more efficiently, to discourage the
practice of defensive medicine, to improve the quality of medical care, to
reduce the incidence of iatrogenic injury, and to rationalize medical mal-
practice litigation.
Gary W. Kuc
213. See supra notes 94-121 and accompanying text.
214. See Hirshfeld, supra note 11, at 1560 (arguing that forcing physicians to follow
practice parameters may be harmful in some cases).
215. See supra notes 149-158 and accompanying text; see also Garnick et al., supra note
201, at 2859 (arguing that physicians will benefit from fewer injuries and lawsuits).
216. See supra notes 131-133 and accompanying text.
217. Stephenson, supra note 56, at 4.
